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OLIGOPOLY AND SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
INTRODUCTION
The creation of the Federal Trade Commission . . . made
available a continuous administrative process by which
fruition of Sherman Law violations could be aborted. But it
is another thing to suggest that anything in business activity
that may, if unchecked, offend the particularizations of the
Clayton Act may now be reached by the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The curb on the Commission's power, as
expressed by the series of cases beginning with the Gratz
case . . . would be relaxed, and unbridled intervention into
business practices encouraged.
When Justice Frankfurter wrote this portion of his dissent in FTC v.
Motion Picture Adv. Co.,' he was primarily concerned with the scope
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) 2 in rela-
tion to the Clayton Act .° He felt that since the Clayton Act was
intended to reach antitrust practices in their incipiency,4 an incipiency
was necessary for Section 5 of the FTCA to reach incipient violations
of the Clayton Act. The unbridled intervention under the FTCA
predicted by Justice Frankfurter, regarding Clayton Act business
practices,5 may now have materialized in relation to Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.° The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
recently proposed issuing a complaint' against the nation's five largest
tire manufacturers° alleging, inter alia, that they are "now using and
for many years have used and pursued parallel courses of business
behavior constituting unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
and practices in commerce."' The challenged business practices con-
sist of substantially similar leasing agreements used by the manufac-
turers to supply "bus mileage tires" to transit companies. The agree-
ments cover virtually the entire highly concentrated bus tire market.'
The proposed complaint alleges that the tire manufacturers refuse
1 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953) (emphasis added).
2 is U.S.C. ¢§. 41-58 (1970). Section 45(a)(1) (§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act provides: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1970).
4 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922).
5 For examples of such interventions concerning the Clayton Act, see Grand Union
Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962) and FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316
(1966).
(1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
7 Federal Trade Commission •Proposed Complaint, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. n 19,381
at 21,511 (1970).
8 Goodyear, Firestone, Uniroyal, B. F. Goodrich and General Tire. Id. at 21,510.
9 Id. at 21,511.
1" Goodyear has 33 percent of this market, Firestone 30 percent, Goodrich 21 per-
cent, General 8 percent and Uniroyal 7 percent. Id. at 21,511.
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to sell tires except upon termination of a leasing agreement. Under
their respective agreements with transit companies, manufacturers
require the customer to obtain substantially all of its bus tire require-
ments from the lessor for the duration of the lease. At the end of the
lease the transit company must "buyout" all the inventory it then has
on lease. The complaint further alleges that to intensify the deterrent
effect of the buyout requirement, the tire manufacturers commonly
inflate a customer's inventory of bus tires prior to the expiration date
of the lease, and use pricing methods which make the purchase price
to the transit companies higher than normal inventory value. In
addition, the tire manufacturers provide service for bus mileage tires
only as an integral part of a leasing agreement.'
The unique antitrust theory prof erred by the FTC in this suit
merits close attention. Conscious parallelism, or identical business be-
havior, has long been considered competent evidence of a conspiracy
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 12 The unique aspect of the tire
leasing complaint, however, is that no combination, conspiracy or
agreement is evident from the facts alleged, nor is one charged as the
basis of the violation. For this reason, the FTC proceeded under
Section 5 of the FTCA rather than under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Never before has the business practice of identically following
the conduct of competitors been considered illegal under either Section
1 of the Sherman Act or Section 5 of the FTCA. Although this case
was recently settled by a consent order announced on March 12, 1971,
the antitrust theory utilized by the FTC in its complaint has impor-
tant implications. This article will examine and analyze the propriety
of using Section 5 of the FTCA as a basic antitrust weapon for con-
trolling oligopolis tic behavior. The effectiveness of using section 5
to establish parallel business behavior as an unfair method of competi-
tion, and its effectiveness as a remedy to problems posed by oligop-
olistic markets will be the primary considerations.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF "UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION"
The origin of the concept embodied in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act is to be found in the regulatory intentions of
Congress which surrounded enactment of the Sherman Act. The policy
determinations embodied in the Sherman Act, and their subsequent
judicial interpretations, prompted congressional action that resulted
in passage of the FTCA and the Clayton Act.
The post-Civil War industrial period in the United States saw
the creation of powerful corporate empires. The Sherman Act was the
first manifestation of a congressional antitrust policy in response to
11 Id.
12 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) ; Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) ; Norfolk Monument Co.,
Inc. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
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a growing public fear of industrial monopolies." Senator Sherman
summarized the purpose of the Act when he stated that it was intended
"to prevent and control combinations made with a view to prevent
competition, or for the restraint of trade or to increase the profits of
the producer at the cost of the consumer."" Generally, the statute was
intended to promote consumer welfare" and to prevent concerted
business activity that exacted monopolistic profits." It was to be
liberally construed by the courts. The statute was not to be applied
indiscriminately to all contracts and combinations involving inter-
state commerce, however, only to those combinations that prevented
competition and restrained trade.• To the legislators concerned with
protecting consumers the purpose of the Act seemed clear.
From the outset, the troubling aspect of the Sherman Act was its
lack of a governing standard, in view of the statute's absolute prohibi-
tory language. Under common law not all contracts in restraint of
trade were held to be void or unenforceable by the courts. Some were
permitted to exist because of their reasonable character." Although
valid, they were nevertheless contracts in restraint of trade and were
so described by the common law. Initially, the Supreme Court met
this ambiguity head on by expressly rejecting the common law argu-
ment that Congress could not have intended the Act to embrace all
contracts, only those contracts resulting in unreasonable restraints of
trade." After careful consideration of the common law interpretive
distinctions inherent in the term "contract in restraint of trade," Justice
Peckham concluded that:
By the simple use of the term "contract in restraint of
trade," all contracts of that nature, whether valid or other-
wise, would be included, and not alone that kind of contract
which was invalid and unenforceable as being in unreason-
able restraint of trade. When, therefore, the body of an act
pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc.,
the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not
limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreason-
able restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such
language, and no exception or limitation can be added with-
13 1 S. Whitney, Antitrust Policies 4-5 (1958).
14 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890).
18 Bork, Legislative Intent and Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. Law & Econ. 7
(1966).
18 Posner, Oligopoly and Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev.
1562, 1578 n.4 (1969).
17 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890).
18 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
13 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897).
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out placing in the act that which has been omitted by Con-
gress."
The Sherman Act was read to embrace all direct restraints imposed
upon commerce by any combination, conspiracy or monopoly whose
natural effect was to restrain competition, rather than permitting or
promoting it.2' Thus, the prohibitive language of the Act was given
full effect in order to carry out congressional intention.
Although this statutory construction prevailed for fourteen years,
it was utilized infrequently. In 1911, the Supreme Court reversed
itself in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States22 by adopting
the dissent in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association.22
In Trans-Missouri Justice White had stated that "it seems to me .. .
impossible to construe the words every restraint of trade used in the
act in any other sense than as excluding reasonable contracts ... .
[S]uch contracts were not considered to be . . . in restraint of trade
. both in England and in this country at the time the act was
adopted."' By this decision the "rule of reason" was read into the
Sherman Act, providing the judiciary with the time-tested common
law standard of unreasonableness—a standard that arguably had been
intentionally excluded by Congress.
Congressional reaction to judicial legislating of the rule of reason
into the Sherman Act was not long in coming. Within twenty-four
hours after the rule's pronouncement, Senator Newlands said on the
floor of the Senate:
The question therefore presents itself to us whether we
are to permit in the future the administration regarding these
great combinations to drift practically into the hands of the
courts and subject the question as to the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of any restraint upon trade . . . to the
varying judgments of different courts upon the facts and the
law, or whether we will organize [a commission] as the ser-
vant of the Interstate Commerce Commission, with the
powers of recommendation, with powers of condemnation,
with powers of correction similar to those enjoyed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission over interstate transpor-
tation."
It was the Senator's contention that had such a commission been
organized when the Sherman Act became law, "we would have been
saved the economic wrench that is now to take place through the
dissolution of these giant corporations and the restoration of their
20 Id. at 328.
21
 Northern Securities Ca. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904).
22 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
23 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897).
24 Id. at 354.
25 47 Cong. Rec. 1225 (1911).
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constituent elements."" Subsequently, Senator Newlands filed two
bills27 calling for the creation of an interstate trade commission and
providing for federal registration of corporations. Neither bill was
enacted into law but their proposal prompted a congressional investi-
gation by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce into "what
changes are necessary or desirable in the laws of the United States
relating to the creation and control of corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce." 28 Congressional dissatisfaction with the rule of
reason as a regulatory standard thus resulted in an immediate exam-
ination of alternative means to regulate commerce.
The Committee's report" concluded that "whenever the rule [of
reason] is invoked the court does not administer the law, but makes
the law."8° It was considered inconceivable that "the courts may be
permitted to test each restraint of trade by the economic standard
which the individual members of the court may happen to have ... ,'"'
especially in a country governed by a written constitution and a statu-
tory code. The report also suggested enactment of a federal incorpora-
tion law which would declare specific trade practices illegal and which
would provide statutory methods for dealing with evolving trade
practices. Additionally, the committee recommended the establishment
of a commission for the better administration of the law and its en-
forcement. 82 The significance of these developments is evident. Ap-
plication of the rule of reason was considered to be judicial frustration
of the legislative intent expressed in the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court's decision in Standard Oil strongly antagonized Congress and
led it to consider other methods for the administration of antitrust
policies.
Three bills were introduced and filed in committee. H.R. 1561.3,
introduced by Representative Covington, and S. 4160, introduced by
Senator Newlands, both dealt with the creation of a federal trade
commission. While these bills were in committee Representative Clay-
ton introduced a bill intended to supplement existing antitrust laws
which declared specific trade practices as being criminal. Originally,
none of the three trade bills contained any reference to unfair methods
of competition, but Senator Newlands' bill, as it was reported out of
the Interstate Commerce Committee, was strengthened by a provision
declaring unfair competition in commerce illegal." Referring to this
28 Id. at 1227, Note the pre-Commission recognition of the need to dissolve these
combinations. This theory of dealing with the problem will be discussed at length infra.
27 S. 2941, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1911), see 47 Cong. Rec. 2444 (1911) for text;
and S. 2941, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1911), see 47 Cong. Rec. 2619-20 (1911) for text.
28 S. Res. 98, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 47 Cong. Rec. 3225-26 (1911).
29 S. Rep. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1913).
BO Id. at 10.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 12.
88 S. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). Later, the Covington bill was
referred to this same committee, which then substituted the Newlands bill for it.
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provision, which subsequently became Section 5 of the FTCA, the
Committee Report indicated that:
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question
as to whether it would attempt to define the many and vari-
able unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to for-
bid [them] . or whether it would, by a general declaration
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to
determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the
latter course would be better, for the reason . . . that there
were too many unfair practices to define and after writing 20
of them into law, it would be quite possible to invent others
. . .. It is believed that the term "unfair competition" has a
legal significance which can be enforced by the commission
and the courts, and that it is no more difficult to determine
what is unfair competition than it is to determine what is a
reasonable rate or what is an unjust discrimination."
Congress, however, had learned its lesson from the judicial mis-
interpretation of the Sherman Act. Subsequent congressional debate
on the choice of the phrase "unfair competition" produced change.
Senator Reed was the first to raise the argument that at common law
unfair competition had been narrowly construed to mean "passing
off," or the substitution of goods A for goods B," and that unless
some other term were employed, courts might adopt this interpreta-
tion as the meaning of Congress. The general consensus on this point
led to the suggestion that the two words be separated by some addi-
tional word, such as "oppressive" or "method,' which would not
undermine the purpose of the prohibition. The phrase "unfair method
of competition" was adopted. It was considered a new legal term lack-
ing any ancestral roots in the common law and, consequently, a term
which would provide necessary flexibility and elasticity to deal with
evolving characteristics of the industrial community. Senator New-
lands best summarized the congressional meaning of the phrase when
he said: "my belief is that this phrase will cover everything that we
want, and will have such an elastic character that it will meet every
new condition and every new practice that may be invented with a
view to gradually bringing about monopoly through unfair competi-
tion.787
As seen from the foregoing discussion, Section 5 of the FTCA
was intended to be a broad, flexible, regulatory mandate which would
meet all unfair business practices of the future. Moreover, it may be
viewed in two dimensions. First, at its narrowest point, the rubric un-
fair methods of competition is a flexible administrative tool that cannot
84 Id. at 13.
85 51 Cong. Rec. 12934 (1914).
Be Id. at 12145.
87 Id. at 12024.
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be defined in terms of constants. Second, it embodies congressional
recognition of evolving commercial dexterity and economic power as
important aspects of trade." The suggested underlying proposition of
section 5 is that "a free competitive society must have some means of
preventing that very freedom to compete from destroying our economic
system.'"9
The broad, flexible character of section 5 is further emphasized
if considered in relation to subsequent debates concerning the Clayton
Act, enacted during the same year. The Clayton Act expressly declared
unlawful specific business practices which Congress considered com-
petitively harmful. Section 5, on the other hand, was considered a new
test for future business developments. During the debates relevant to
the specificity of the Clayton Act, reference was continually made
to the sufficient support which would be provided by section 5. 40
 This
important relationship between specificity and flexibility demonstrates
the congressional design of section 5 and, as will be seen later, assists
in defining the interrelating scope of the two statutes concerning anti-
trust policy.
Despite congressional intention to delegate to the FTC the
primary power of determining what practices were unfair,' in grant-
ing jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeals of the United States to
"affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside orders of the Commission. . . . »42
Congress supported judicial delineation of the jurisdictional bound-
aries of section 5. It is important, at this point, to summarize these
jurisdictional limits and to view in perspective the interrelationships
of policy that exist among Section 5 of the FTCA and the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.
The scope of section 5 as an antitrust statute has gradually been
expanded by the courts since its initial restrictive interpretation in
FTC v. Gratz," the first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated
a Commission order under section 5. The Gratz opinion correctly rec-
ognized that the words "unfair methods of competition" constituted
new legal phraseology, yet it failed to carry forward the express con-
gressional designs for the Commission. Instead, it was the Supreme
Court's interpretation that the courts, not the Commission, should
ultimately determine what practices fall within the ambit of section 5
by using policy considerations of the other antitrust statutes as guides.
This limited interpretation, however, has changed drastically in the
succeeding forty-five years. Indeed, it has been broadened to the point
where proof of anticompetitive effects resulting from the challenged
practice are no longer necessary to find an unfair method of competi-
88 Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing
Process of Redefinition, 7 Vi11. L. Rev. 517, 519 (1962).
20 Id.
40 51 Cong. Rec. 14257 (1914) (remarks of Senator Clapp).
41 Senate Report, note 33 supra.
42 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1970).
43 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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tion." The scope of section 5 as an antitrust statute has come full
circle. No longer is it confined to the "policy" of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. It has now become coextensive with the "spirit" of these
two statutes, thus making the substantive reach of section 5 greater
than that of the other two statutes individually and collectively.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 5
A. The Initial Restrictive Interpretation
In Gratz" the FTC charged a manufacturer of jute bagging
(material used to bale cotton) with "tying" the sale of steel ties (also
essential for baling) to the bagging. The competitive importance of
this practice arose because Gratz was the exclusive distributor of
Carnegie Steel Company ties, a situation which foreclosed other
bagging manufacturers from obtaining steel ties from Carnegie in
order to effectively compete. The Supreme Court dismissed the FTC's
cease and desist order, concluding that the Commission had shown
neither a monopoly nor a monopolistic design on the part of Gratz.
Further, the Court concluded that:
The words "unfair method of competition" are not defined
by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for
the courts . . . to determine as matter of law what they in-
clude. They are clearly inapplicable to practices never here-
tofore regarded as opposed to good morals . . . or as against
public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or create monopoly."
Justice Brandeis vigorously dissented from the majority's interpreta-
tion of section 5 and of the powers of the Commission. Relying heavily
upon the legislative history of the section, he concluded that the Court
had usurped the primary discretionary power of the Commission to
initially determine which practices are unfair, thus frustrating con-
gressional purpose behind the enactment of section 5.' 7 His argument
had no immediate effect.
An affirmation of the Gratz interpretation came three years later,
in two unanimous decisions. In FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co.," the
Court considered the legality of a magazine company's distribution
system involving exclusive dealing contracts which the Commission
had found violative of both Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section
5 of the FTCA. The Court first dismissed the Clayton Act violation on
the ground that the relationship between publisher and distributor
was one of principal and agent, not one of buyer and seller, thereby
placing it outside the scope of Section 3. Since the agency contracts
44 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966).
45 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
40 Id. at 427.
4T Id. at 437.
48 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
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were made "without unlawful motive and in the orderly course of an
expanding business. . . ," the Court held they could not be prohibited
under section 5." Accordingly, the Commission's cease and desist
order was set aside.
In the second case, FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.," the Court
again reversed a Commission cease and desist order prohibiting ex-
clusive dealing contracts. Sinclair had provided gasoline storage tanks
and pumps to its lessees on the condition that only Sinclair gasoline
be used with the equipment. Here again, the Commission held these
contracts violative of both Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 5
of the FTCA. The Court, however, dismissed the Clayton Act charge
because the agreements were found not to forbid dealers from dealing
in the commodities of a competitor. The Court disposed of the Com-
mission's section 5 finding in a fashion similar to that used in the
Curtis case. It reversed on the grounds that "no purpose or power to
acquire unlawful monopoly has been disclosed, and the record does
not show that the probable effect of the practice will be unduly to
lessen competition." 6f Moreover, in what appeared to be a final blow
to the flexibility of section 5 and the power of the Commission, the
Court stated:
The powers of the Commission are limited by the
statutes. It has no general authority to compel competitors
to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business
methods or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those en-
gaged in the conflict for advantage called competition."
These three Supreme Court decisions imposed upon the Commis-
sion the burden of showing a potential, substantial lessening of com-
petition or tendency to monopoly—the criteria of the Clayton Act—
before a section 5 violation could be found. Further, as a practical
matter, the generalities of the FTCA were held not to grant to the
Commission authority to forbid business activities unless they had a
detrimental impact on competition."
B. The Gradual Expansion in Scope
The first expansive step taken by the judiciary in reconsidering
the precise limits imposed upon section 5 by earlier decisions was made
in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co." In Beech-Nut the Supreme Court
affirmed a Commission order finding that the Beech-Nut Company
had violated section 5 with its distribution practices. The so-called
40 Id. at 582.
60 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
61 Id. at 475.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
Ds Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 Antitrust Bull. 161, 166 (1960).
64 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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Beech-Nut Policy by stipulation was referred to as a "system" prob-
ably because of the absence of any contract, combination or con-
spiracy. The system was effectuated by Beech-Nut's refusal to sell to
wholesalers or retailers who marketed their products below a suggested
retail price. There were no facts demonstrating an express agreement,
only a tacit understanding that if a wholesaler or jobber sold to a
price-cutting retailer, the wholesaler would no longer be considered a
"selected" or "desirable" dealer." The company maintained a record
of all "desirable" dealers and continually updated and distributed it
to its wholesalers and retailers.
Since there was no express contract, combination or conspiracy,
the Sherman Act was involved in the Supreme Court's review of
Beech-Nut only "in so far as it shows a declaration of public policy
to be considered in determining what are unfair methods of competi-
tion, which the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to condemn
and suppress."' Addressing itself to the power of the FTC to deter-
mine an unfair method of competition, the Court concluded:
If the "Beech-Nut System of Merchandising" is against
public policy because of its "dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or create monopoly," it was within the
power of the Commission to make an order forbidding its
continuation . . . . The facts found show that the Beech-Nut
system goes far beyond the simple refusal to sell . . . . The
system here disclosed necessarily constitutes a scheme which
restrains the natural flow of commerce . . . .57
The Court determined that the specific facts demonstrated a degree of
cooperation among the parties which, although falling short of agree-
ment, accomplished the purposes of an agreement just as effectively. 58
Significantly, the Beech-Nut decision authorized the Commission to
&alien& certain types of collusive activity, not falling within the
Sherman Act, which the Gratz Court had found were outside the ambit
of section 5. 5°
In Beech-Nut, the Court looked to the policy of the Sherman Act
for a standard to govern the application of section 5. The test of what
constituted an unfair method of competition was broadened so as to
require only a violation of the policy behind the Sherman Act. The
Court further expanded this "policy" test to include the Clayton Act,
in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC," where it
5 Id. at 447.
58
 Id. at 453.
5T Id. at 454.
58 Id. at 455.
59 In FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927), the Court, in
considering a § 5 violation, asserted that "[an] understanding, express or tacit, that the
agreed prices will be followed is enough to constitute a transgression of the law. No
provision to compel adherence Is necessary." Id. at 62.
60 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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upheld the FTC's decision that an industry-wide group boycott was a
violation of section S. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, stated
that if the defendant's "purpose and practice . . . runs counter to the
public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal
Trade Commission has the power to suppress it as an unfair method
of competition."" Substantial criticism has been directed to this posi-
tion on the ground that the language implies the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act might now have a broader reach than the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.°2 This criticism is without merit, for the Court expressly
concluded on the facts of Fashion Originators' that both a Section 3
Clayton Act and Section 1 Sherman Act violation did exist." The
Court did not broaden the reach of section 5 beyond that of the other
antitrust statutes; it simply equated them. The asserted implication
that section 5 has surpassed the Sherman and Clayton Acts in reach
is dispelled by the equalizing language of the decision. Even assuming
that such a broadening interpretation had taken place, it would appear
to be consistent with the congressional intent behind adoption of the
term "unfair methods of competition." Regardless of the rationale
supporting the Court's pronouncement, subsequent judicial develop-
ments have substantially expanded the scope of section 5, with heavy
reliance upon the "policy" standard as a guide."
By releasing unfair methods of competition from the confines of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Beech-Nut opinion created con-
fusion in the business community concerning the precise boundaries
of section 5. The uncertainty of the policy test was the primary cause
of concern. In FTC v. Cement Institute," a significant case concern-
ing the interrelationship of Section 5 of the FTCA and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, a slight degree of uncertainty was dispelled. There the
Commission challenged a pricing system as being an instrumentality
for price fixing and thus a violation of section 5. The government
had previously challenged the same system under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, but had failed substantially to prove a combination or
agreement to fix prices." Referring to the overlap of the two acts in
relation to collusive practices, the Court in Cement Institute stated:
[A]lthough all conduct violative of the Sherman Act may
likewise come within the unfair trade practice prohibitions
of the Trade Commission Act, the converse is not necessarily
true. It has long been recognized that there are many unfair
methods of competition that do not assume the proportions
of Sherman Act violations."
61 Id. at 463.
02 Howrey, supra note 53, at 170.
68 312 U.S. at 464-65.
64 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
65 333 U.S. 683 (1948),
00 Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
67 333 U.S. at 694.
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Morever, in distinguishing the earlier dismissed case Under Section 1
of the Sherman Ad, the Court deterniitied that:
[I]ndividual conduct, or concerted conduct; which falls short
of being a Sherman Act violatiOri may as a matter of law con-
§titute an "unfair method of competition" prohibited by the
Trade Commission Act. A major purpose Of that Ad, as we
haVe frequently said, was to enable the Commission to re-
strain practice§ as "Unfair" which, although not yet having
grown into Sherinan Act dimensions would, most likely do so
if left Unrestrained."
Hence, Cement Institute provided a further definition of unfair
methods of competition as related to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court's determination that "inclividlial conduct" not yet a Sher-
man Act violation might nonetheless constitute an unfair method of
competition provided support för future judicial utilizatiOn of section
5 to prohibit consciously parallel bUsiness behavior.
In Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. ;
 Inc. v. FTC," the FTC had
found that the use of a mathematical formula to compute delivery
price by the members of a trade association constituted a conspiracy
to fix prices and an unfair method of competition violative of section
5. The petitioner appealed from both findings, claiming that the Com-
mission had prOven collusion only by the "capacity, tendency and
effect" of the alleged conspiracy and not by demonstrating how the
parties colluded.7° The petitioners fUrther contended that, absent
proof of agreement to conspire, pricing decisions were merely indi-
vidual reactions to competition and thtis could not be considered
unfair methods of competition.' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit responded by affirming both the Commission's findings and its
order.72
 After reviewing the record of evidence, which contained a
history of identical bids and prices similar to those shown in Cement
InstitUte, the court held that a conspiracy had been proven by cir-
cumstantial evidence." In considering the contention that individual
use of the basing point method of computing deliVery prices, with
knowledge that other members used it, did not constitute an unfair
method of competition, the court stated:
Each seller consciously intends not to attempt the exclusitm
of any competition from his natural freight advantage terri-
tory by reducing the price, and in effect invites the others to
share the available business at matched prices in his natural
market in return for a reciprocal invitation . . . .
68 Id. at 708.
69 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336
U.S. 956 (1949).
70 168 F.2d at 178-79.
71 Id. at 180.
72 Id. at 181.
73 Id. at 180.
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In the light of [the Cement Institute] opinion we cannot
say that the Commission was wrong in concluding that the
individual use of the basing point method as here used does
constitute an unfair method of competition."
As rationale for condemning these individual practices, the court
quoted directly from and applied the earlier discussed language of
Cement Institute concerning individual conduct that might involve a
section 5 violation.
Section 5 was similarly applied in FTC v. Motion Picture Adv.
Co." to condemn individual conduct which the Supreme Court held
violative of the Sherman Act." The respondent and three similar
companies held exclusive agreements with three-fourths of all the
theaters in the United States for the showing of their films. An FTC
cease and desist order had previously required the discontinuance of
this concerted activity." In Motion Picture Adv. Co. the Commission
found that the respondent's contracts were an unfair method of com-
petition by themselves, and ordered that the time of such exclusive
agreements be reduced from their duration of three to five years to
one year. On appeal, the respondent argued that the sole issue in the
Commission's complaint had been adjudicated in the former proceed-
ings and that the Commission's order was therefore barred by res
judicata."
The Court distinguished the earlier Commission proceeding as
one involving a conspiracy or agreement. Because no concerted activity
was alleged in the instant proceeding, the complaint challenged only
the legality of the unilateral action of the respondent. Thus, the doc-
trine of res judicata was found not applicable. The Court held that
activity prohibited by the Sherman Act would likewise be prohibited
as an unfair method of competition." Significantly, the Court utilized
section 5 as independent authority for prohibiting the respondent's
conduct. The scope of section 5 in relation to the other antitrust
statutes was summarized by Justice Douglas in the majority opinion:
The "unfair methods of competition" which are con-
demned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that
were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the
Sherman Act . . . . Congress advisedly left the concept flex-
ible to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases
from the field of busineSs . . . . It is also clear that the Fed-
' 4 Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
75 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
16 Id. at 395.
77 In re Screen Broadcast Corp., 36 F.T.C. 957, 993 (1943).
78 344 U.S. at 397-98.
10 344 U.S. at 395. The Court stated: "It is, we think, plain from the Commission's
finding that a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few
falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method of
competition' within the meaning of 5(a) of the Federal Trade CommissiOn Act." Id.
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eral Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and
bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . . . to stop in
their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown,
would violate those Acts . as well as to condemn as "unfair
methods of competition" existing violations of them. 8°
Justice Frankfurter dissented, relying principally upon the con-
tention that the Commission had simply, inferred from the previous
adjudications of the case that the contracts unreasonably restricted
and restrained competition. He considered it significant that no evi-
dence of a market analysis had been presented to substantiate such a
finding. 81
 In short, Justice Frankfurter feared that the Court might
become a rubber stamp for Commission findings and thereby en-
courage "unbridled intervention into business practices." 82
Motion Picture Adv. Co. expanded the scope of section 5 insofar
as its regulation of individual activity was concerned. A contract which
had allowed competitors to obtain a substantial share of a particular
market through conspiracy was declared an unfair method of com-
petition when unilaterally used by one producer. Not only could
section 5 prohibit conspiratorial activities falling within Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, it could also prohibit subsequent similar activity by
the individual participants. Moreover, the necessity to demonstrate a
likely restriction upon competition was not required.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the Beech-Nut
decision provided the cornerstone for a series of section 5 cases deal-
ing with tacitly collusive business behavior, most notably those deal-
ing with basing point delivery systems. 88 Beech-Nut is frequently cited
for the proposition that the existence of a "combination" is not an
indispensable ingredient of an unfair method of competition under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Beech-Nut and its progeny may thus
provide substantial precedent for the Commission's treatment of par-
allel business behavior.
C. Elevation to Antitrust Independence
Throughout judicial development of the limits on section 5,
courts have mindfully restricted its application to anticompetitive
practices potentially cognizable under either the Clayton or Sherman
Acts. Two recent decisions have eroded these restrictions, however,
and have thus elevated section 5 to independent antitrust status.
In Grand Union Co. v. FTC," the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a Commission finding that the petitioner, a
buyer, had violated section 5 by inducing its suppliers to grant dis-
88 Id. at 394-95.
81 Id. at 401-02.
82 Id. at 405.
83 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), and Triangle Conduit & Cable
Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948).
84 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
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criminatory promotional allowances. In the Commission's opinion,
petitioner had violated the "spirit" of Section 2 (d) of the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act," which prohibits sellers from in-
ducing, soliciting or paying discriminatory allowances. In Grand Union
the buyer had solicited the discriminatory allowance. The court held,
first, that the Commission's findings were consistent with the basic
purpose and policy of section 5, which condoned flexibility, and
second, that Grand Union's activities were inconsistent with the purpose
of section 2 (d). Despite the inconsistency with the "seller" language
in section 2 (d), the court saw no need to "resort to metaphysical
subtleties to denominate [Grand Union's] . . . conduct an unfair
method of competition. 78° Furthermore, no proof of injury to compe-
tition had to be demonstrated. Because section 2 (d) defined an
offense that was per se illegal, the court determined that a rule that
applied to the seller should similarly apply to the buyer."
In the second recent decision to further expand the scope of
section 5, FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc.," the Supreme Court affirmed
the Commission's authority to declare a franchise program an unfair
method of competition without having to demonstrate actual anti-
competitive effects. Brown Shoe had entered into franchise contracts
with a substantial number of independent retail shoe stores which
essentially prohibited the latter from dealing in any line of shoes
manufactured by Brown's competitors. According to the Commission,
the franchise program effectively foreclosed Brown's competitors
from a substantial share of the retail markets. On review, the Supreme
Court emphasized the broad powers of the Commission to declare
trade practices unfair and condemned the program for conflicting
with the central "policy" of both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Section 3 of the Clayton Act."
The argument of the respondent, however, centered upon the
power of the Commission to declare the franchise program illegal,
absent proof showing that the franchise program's effect was to sub-
stantially lessen competition or that it tended to create a monopoly."
Expressly rejecting this contention the Court stated:
This program obviously conflicts with the central policy of
both § I of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act
against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers
to buy in an open market . . . [therefore] the Commission
has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipi-
ency without proof that they amount to an outright violation
85 IS	 H 13, 13a, 13b and 21a (1970). Section 13a (§ 2(d) of the Robinson-
Patman Act) states that it is unlawful for sellers to solicit discriminatory allowances.
86 300 F.2d at 99.
87
 Id.
88 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
89 Id. at 320-21.
9G Id. at 321.
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of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust
It would appear that the Supreme Court thus completely divested
section 5 of the limitation restricting it to acts that might become full
blown violations of the other statutes if left unrestrained. Coupled
with this new independence was a relaxed burden of proof, one which
did not require the showing of demonstrable anticompetitive effects.
The Court in effect stated that section 5 has the potential to prohibit
those practices which violate either the Sherman or Clayton Acts and
also those that fall short of clear cut violations of those acts but which
still "violate" the policy or spirit of those statutes. From the preceding
discussion the obvious question arises whether this broad interpretation
of section 5, coupled with the lighter burden of proof, renders the
Sherman and Clayton Acts superfluous. Whatever displacement effect
these decisions may produce, it is clear that section 5 has come of age
as an antitrust statute.
A further expansion of the scope of section 5, regarding its in-
dependence as an antitrust statute, is evident from the Supreme Court
decisions in the so-called "TBA" trilogy. In 1956, the FTC brought
simultaneous proceedings" against major oil and tire manufacturers
alleging that the sales commission method of distributing tires, bat-
teries and accessories (referred to as the TBA plan) was an unfair
method of competition. Under that plan the tire companies paid com-
missions to the oil companies on the gross amount of TBA sales made
by the dealers of each oil company. Each complaint paired one of the
large tire and rubber product manufacturers with a large oil company."
In the first case of the trilogy, Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,"
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit which had sustained the Commission's order against
Atlantic and Goodyear." Essentially, the order had prohibited Atlantic
from participating in any sales-commission arrangement with Atlantic
or any other oil company." At the outset, the Court recognized that
the Atlantic-Goodyear contract was not a tying arrangement prohibited
by the Sherman or Clayton Acts. What the Court did find, however,
was that the central competitive character of the arrangement con-
sisted of "the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail
competition in another."" Further, the market power that permitted
such an arrangement was bolstered by evidence of actual threats and
coercive practices directed toward the service station dealers. The
91 Id,
92 In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961), In re Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 371 (1961), In re B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 F.T.C. 1176 (1961).
23 Goodyear was paired with Atlantic, 58 F.T.C. at .310, Firestone with Shell, 58
F.T.C. at 372, and B.F. Goodrich with Texaco, 58 F.T.C. at 1176.
D4 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
95 Id. at 372-73.
96 58 F.T.C. at 369-71.
97 381 U.S. at 369.
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standard applied by the Court in reviewing the Section 5 violation was
that the challenged conduct must "run counter to the public policy
declared in the Federal Trade Commission Act" regardless of its
failure to assume the proportions of an antitrust violation." In finding
the sales-commission plan an unfair method of competition on its face,
the Court stated:
The short of it is that Atlantic, with Goodyear's en-
couragement and assistance, has marshalled its full economic
power in a continuing campaign to force its dealers and
wholesalers to buy Goodyear products. The anticompetitive
effects of this program are clear on the record and render
unnecessary extensive economic analysis of market per-
centages or business justifications in determining whether
this was a method of competition which Congress has de-
clared unfair and therefore unlawful."
While the Supreme Court in Atlantic Refining remained consistent
with its previous approach toward the scope and reach of section 5, it
developed a new rationale to support such expansion. The coercive
utilization of economic power to foreclose competition from a prior
open market was considered enough to substantiate a section 5 violation.
Conflicting application of the Atlantic Refining principles by the
Fifth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts in the other two cases
of the trilogy emphasizes the newness of the "market power" theory.
In the second case, Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 1" the Fifth Circuit sustained
a Commission order against Shell and Firestone similar to the Atlantic-
Goodyear order. The court concluded that, in light of Atlantic Refining,
substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Shell:
(1) had dominant economic power over its dealers, (2) had exerted
that power through natural leverage and through control devices in
carrying out its TBA plan, and (3) had caused adverse competitive
effects on a not insubstantial p6rtion of the TBA market."' These
three factors were interpreted from the Atlantic Refining holding as
the essential components which must exist before a sales-commission
plan can be held an unfair method of competition. The most significant
and essential factor supporting all three components is dominant
economic power.
In the third case of the trilogy, Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,'" the court
of appeals reversed the cease and desist order and remanded the case
to the Commission for dismissal. The distinguishing aspect of the
Texaco-Goodrich arrangement was the absence of coercion and anti-
competitive effects. Texaco, unlike Atlantic and Shell, had never
98 Id.
99 Id. at 371.
100 360 F.2d 470 (51.6 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
191 Id. at 487.
192 383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
129
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
worked with tire representatives to pressure dealers into buying the
company sponsored TBA. 1" In fact, the Commission examiner found
that the Texaco policy since 1948 had been to permit each dealer to
choose whatever brand TBA he desired."' While the court recognized
the interpretation given to Atlantic Refining by the Fifth Circuit, it
concluded that "the record simply does not support a finding that
Texaco violated the [Federal Trade Commission] Act."'" In so holding
the court stated:
[W]hile the record shows Texaco indeed has dominant
economic power, it is fatally deficient on the crucial issues
of exercise of that power and subsequent anticompetitive
effects.'"
In FTC v. Texaco, Inc.'" the Commission challenged the decision
of the court of appeals, asserting that the mere exercise of economic
power, even without overt coercive acts, is inherently an unfair method
of competition. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that:
While the evidence in the present case fails to establish the
kind of overt coercive acts shown in Atlantic, we think it
clear nonetheless that Texaco's dominant economic power
was used in a manner which tended to foreclose competition
in the marketing of TBA. The sales-commission system for
marketing TBA is inherently coercive . . . . The Commis-
sion is not required to show that a practice it condemns has
totally eliminated competition in the relevant market. It is
enough that the Commission found that the practice in ques-
tion unfairly burdened competition for a not insignificant
volume of commerce."'
The Supreme Court appears to have decided in the TBA cases
that practices stemming from the manufacturer's market power which
unfairly burden a significant amount of competition are coercive per
se and consequently constitute unfair methods of competition.'"
Further, it is probable though not certain that the TBA decisions, by
reemphasizing the necessity for anticompetitive effects in their use of
the "unfairly burden" test, have overruled, sub silentio, the Brown
Shoe decision.
III. EVALUATION OF THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF SECTION 5
Judicial expansion of the scope of section 5 has, until recently,
been considered consistent with the legislative intent expressed therein.
103 Id. at 948-49.
104 Id. at 948 n.12.
108 Id. at 951.
108 Id.
107 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
108 Id. at 228-30.
tog 393 U.S. at 232 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The necessity of showing anticompetitive effects resulting from a
practice potentially violative of Sherman and Clayton Act provisions
is still considered the correct accommodation between the promotion
of fair competition and a proper application of antitrust standards.'"
However, the recent decisions in Grand Union and Brown Shoe have
drawn sharp criticism from the antitrust bar. First, the combined
effect of these cases has been criticized as being a delegation to the
Commission of quasi-legislative power to use section 5 to displace the
other antitrust statutes."' Second, it is charged that the Commission
may now strike down any exclusive dealing arrangement which, in its
unlimited discretion, it deems improper, without having to show the
arrangement's likely anticompetitive effect." 2 Third, it is alleged that
the vague concept of incipiency read into the FTCA has permitted an
administrative agency to refashion statutory standards of legality and
has produced the anomolous compound of "incipient incipiency." 113
Since the Clayton Act is designed to prohibit Sherman Act restraints
in their incipient stage, reading the FTCA as reaching Clayton Act
practices in their incipient stage thus creates a prohibition of incipient
incipiencies.
The first criticism fails to recognize the congressional intent that
prompted enactment of section 5. Legislative history demonstrates
that the term "unfair methods of competition" was specifically used in
section 5 to remedy the Sherman Act misinterpretation problem and
to supplement the specific prohibitions of the Clayton Act. To criticize
the FTC for its flexible application of section 5 to close the technical
loopholes in the other antitrust statutes is to criticize the purposes and
designs of Congress.
More telling criticisms, however, are raised by the second and
third charges, which are similar because both relate to the quantum of
proof necessary to find an unfair method of competition. Application
of section 5 without requiring proof of likely anticompetitive effects
disregards the primary indication of a business method's fairness—its
effect upon competitors. Although recent applications of section 5 may
arguably be praiseworthy because of their flexibility, they nevertheless
diminish the quantum of proof required to what appears to be an un-
reasonable level. An incipient incipiency is an incomprehensible degree
of infraction. When this lesser burden of proof is coupled with the
Commission's broad discretionary power, the result approaches stan-
dardless regulation. Such a development is unnecessary and unwar-
ranted.
As the previously presented legislative history illustrates, section
110 Howrey, Interplay of Unfair Competition and Antitrust Doctrines Under Section
S of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 13-2 Antitrust Bull. 1313, 1333 (1968).
111 Id. at 1321.
112 Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking—Nineteenth Annual
Review, 76 Yale L.J. 92, 98 (1966); Howrey, supra note 110, at 1321.
11a Howrey, supra note 110, at 1332-33.
131
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
5 is not susceptible to rigid definition. It must be flexible in order to
test new methods of competition as they arise. However, the various
interpretations of specific statutory language in other antitrust laws
have tended to obscure the broad mandate of section 5. In their efforts
to suggest more workable and definitive standards to control section
5, the commentators have thus far not agreed. At least three solutions
to the problems created by the Grand Union and Brown Shoe decisions
have been offered. Each one is here separately analyzed.
A. Displacement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
It has been suggested that the extension of section 5 in Brown
Shoe, with its potential for future application, has rendered the Sherman
and Clayton Acts superfluous. It is maintained that their only purpose
in the future, except as a proscription of already full blown anticompeti-
tive practices, will be to serve as a foundation of precedent upon
which a new structure of antitrust law, consisting of unfair methods
of competition, will be built. Such a limited application, however, would
be wasteful. Continued application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
not only preserves their regulatory theories but also permits them to
grow. Reliance entirely upon section 5 as the primary means of regula-
tion might produce an unwanted result. An eventual reversal of the
expansion of section 5, coupled with atrophy in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, would be most detrimental to trade regulation. Certainly,
the courts could return to the narrow Gratz interpretation. The con-
tinued use of the other statutes would prevent such an occurrence.
In utilizing its judicially interpreted powers, the FTC should be
cautious of becoming entangled in "per se" rules concerning section
5.114
 Such rules might work to destroy the flexible nature of the unfair
methods of competition standard.
B. The General Subject Test
In addressing himself to the Grand Union decision, Professor
Handler has proposed what is termed the "general subject" test. 11 °
The fundamental premise underlying this test is that neither the
legislative history nor the litigation of unfair methods of competition
supports the view that the FTC may avoid restrictive statutory lan-
guage by resorting to section 5. 116
 Professor Handler concludes:
There is no general authority in the Commission to formu-
late codes of permissible business behavior or to introduce
into the fabric of competitive regulation its personal predi-
lections of what is good or bad for the economy. There is no
general authority to label conduct as an unfair method of
competition where Congress has spoken on the general sub-
114 Id. at 1333.
115
 Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yak L,J. 75, 95 (1961).
116
 Id. at 93.
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ject but what it has said does not go as far as the Commission
would like.'"
•
While the "general subject" approach provides a competent
standard for accommodating section 5 with the Clayton Act, consider-
able difficulty arises when it is applied to the Sherman Act. The Clayton
Act is more specific than the Sherman Act, so that the task of determin-
ing its general subjects and the corresponding applicability of section
5 is a simpler task. With the Sherman Act it could be asserted under
this approach that, in view of the broad prohibitions of Section 1 and
recent judicial expansion of the concept of conspiracy," 8 section 5 has
no jurisdiction to prohibit business methods which are not covered by
the general subject Congress intended Section 1 to prosecute but which
may now result in a Section 1 Sherman Act violation. Clearly, previous
decisions have held otherwise, demonstrating the complexity of these
concepts, and the unworkability of this approach as a guideline."'
Furthermore, critics of Professor Handler's approach have charged
him with being more concerned with what does not violate section 5
than with what does.' 2°
C. The Equivalent Type of Conduct Test
A more liberal approach to the problem has been suggested by
Professor Oppenheim in his response to the Grand Union decision.121
His test gains support from what he terms a jurisdictional deficiency
in both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. These deficiencies he regarded
as oversights on the part of Congress, arising from a lack of fore-
sight. Because of these deficiencies and the increasing overlap be-
tween the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts,
Professor Oppenheim suggested that:
While alternative constructions may be gleaned from
congressional legislative history, it seems that, on balance,
the Commission has authority under section 5 to proceed
against equivalent types of practices not within the juris-
dictional bounds of the coverage specified in the Clayton
Act.122
Criticism of the equivalency standard consists primarily of two
arguments. First, consideration of jurisdiction in these circumstances
117 Id. at 95.
119 See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962), for a discussion of this
paint.
119 Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as Antitrust: A Com-
ment, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 10 (1967).
120 Id. at 11.
121. Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Cominission
Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1961).
122 Id. at 835.
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reveals an often tenuous and semantic distinction between matters
relating to jurisdiction and matters relating to the merits. Second,
the utilization of a comparison test to determine equivalency might
become arbitrary and mechanical and it would not take into account
particular business or economic characteristics of statutory viola-
tions which may be more important than others. 123 While the equi-
valency test does provide a simple accommodation of statutory
policy, it lacks definitive guidelines capable of controlling the evasive
concepts of section 5. The Commission is cautioned against viewing
this attempted accommodation as an invitation to invoke section 5
whenever it believes conduct runs counter to the "spirit" of either
of the other statutes. Such synthetic jurisdiction was not intended
by Congress nor has it been supported by judicial review.' 24
D. The Open-Ended Injury To Competition Test
A recently developed test that consolidates both the Grand
Union and Brown Shoe decisions involves an open-ended inquiry into
anticompetitive effects. The proponents of this test agree that injury
to competition, no matter what form it takes, is a workable standard
for evaluating methods of competition. 125
 They contemplate applying
this standard to all business practices not proscribed by the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. In discussing the use of section 5 in such an open-
ended test, one commentator has stated:
This does not mean that the other antitrust statutes
are superfluous. The significance of the approach I have
suggested lies in viewing section 5 as an independent source
of antitrust law. The other statutes are useful as guidelines
in formulating general standards of measuring injury to
competition, but the Commission ought not to extract per se
rules from those statutes for use in section 5 cases. If a
respondent's conduct does not violate some other statute,
then it should not be treated as if it did. Each section 5 case
should be judged according to the rules of reason. The
stricter standards of illegality—the per se or almost per se
rules—of other statutes should be reserved for cases in-
volving those statutes.m
It is suggested that this open-ended approach, based upon a rational
analysis of injury to competition, provides the best possible test for
accommodating section 5 with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This
approach advocates permitting the FTC to evaluate practices falling
128 Pearson, supra note 119, at 14.
124 Id. at 18; Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A
Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 517, 540 n.82 (1962).
laa Pearson, supra note 119, at 18.
126 Id.
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outside the scope of . the other S statutes and to develop a field of cor-
responding jurisprudence. Section 5 would then be used as an indepen-
dent source of antitrust law to regulate those practices which
technically avoid the prohibitions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
but which still violate the competitive policies and spirit .of the other
statutes by producing anticompetitive effects.
Utilization of section 5 as an independent source of antitrust
law, guided by the anticompetitive effect standard, would be con-
sistent with the objectives Congress intended both the FTC and
section 5 to achieve. As noted, preservation of competition through
application of a standard capable of dealing with commercial dex-
terity was the primary objective behind passage of section 5. More-
over, concern with the effects on competition rather than with
business conduct or "workable" competition shifts the emphasis of
section 5 back to the original party in interest, the consumer. Main-
tenance of competitive markets protects the consumer by insuring
competitive price levels and qualitatively superior products.
However, the workability of a strict standard depends upon the
Commission's conception of "competition" and upon those effects
it deems necessary to show a violation. Professor Pearson criticizes
a per se rule approach and advocates instead a rule of reason . ap-
proach to evaluate legal levels of competition. The latter approach,
however, would, in effect, revert antitrust law to the day of Stan-
dard Oil and misinterpretation of the Sherman Act.'" A more ap-
propriate guideline than the rule of reason approach would be a
standard that demands absolute maintenance of competition, regard-
less of the reasonableness of the conduct. Under this standard, any
method of business behavior (as distinguished from a deceptive
practice) that produces an anticompetitive effect, no matter how
insignificant, would be considered cognizable by the FTC as a viola-
tion of section 5.
It is submitted that no radical reversal of Supreme Court prece-
dent is necessary to achieve this approach. The distinguishing fea-
ture between an open-ended approach and the Court's opinions in
Grand Union and Brown Shoe is that the former approach requires
proof of anticompetitive effects while the approach in the latter deci-
sions does not. The practice of using section 5 to condemn practices
not expressly covered by the other statutes would continue to be a
method of maintaining viable competition. A clarification by the Su-
preme Court in this regard would benefit not only the consumer,
through lower prices, but also the business community, through
greater certainty.
127 In fairness to Professor PearsOn; it should be noted that he recognized the
problems inherent within an anticompetitive effects standard in relation to the rule of
reason but considered them beyond the scope of his comment. Id. at 15 n.46.
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IV: APPLICATION OF SECTION 5 TO PARALLEL BUSINESS
BEHAVIOR
The paramount question preSented by the Commission's COM-
plainti" against the five largest tire manufacturerS is what the FTC
Must show in Order to establish a violation of section 5. ConSidering
the absence of an express allegation of agreement or conspiracy, the
COMA might have required a showing that each bus-tire leasing agree-
ment in question was a separate bilateral business practice constitu-
ting an unfair method of competition. This, however, was not the
theory of the complaint. The Commission utilized a novel approaCh
in charging the respondents with unfair methods of competition, by
alleging that they "are now using and for many years have used and
pursued parallel courses of business behavior . . . . ;)129
The propriety of using section 5 in this way depends, to a
considerable degree, upon the precedent utilized. As previously noted,
certain cases may provide excellent precedent for prohibiting thete
agreements. Cement Institute, Triangle Conduit and Motion Picture
Adv. Co. support the use of section 5 to condemn individual practices
that fall short of the Sherman and Clayton Act requirement of an
agreement. Particular emphasis might be placed upon Triangle Con-
duit's finding that one's use Of a baSing point system, with knowledge
that other competitors also used it, constituted an unfair method of
Competition. In prior decisions, the practices condemned under set-
thin 5 involved extremely complex and Sophistitated systems which
had required more than normal buSiness efficiency to develop. Nor-
mally, this would suggest Sherman Act colluSion. However, it should
again be noted that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cement Institute
eipressly recognized the government's inability_to establish a Sherman
Act violation in an earlier case. Also, Motion Picture Adv. Co. was a
substantive proceeding charging a violation of section 5 by reason of
unilateral conduct.
As seen from the foregoing discussion proof of collusion is prob-
ably not required under section 5, yet the FTC may have other difficul-
ties with the parallel business behavior theory. The use of similar leasing
agreements by manufacturers of homogeneous products, who sell to
buyers having a common cost structure, may just as likely be the
result of normal business efficiency as the result of conscious parallel
behavior. The economic evidence introdUced might prove this hy-
pothesis, and lead the court to conclude that identical leasing methods
are not unfair methods of competition. 1 B 6
 Strategically, the Com-
128 Federal Trade Commission Proposed Complaint, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. g 19,381
at 21,511 (1970).
1za id;
180 The. Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321(1963), Pioneered the use of modern econoinic theory as a major factoral consideration
in judicial detisions. The Court in that case formulated a presumption of illegality
plicable to mergers, which could be iebutted by economic evidence indiCating non-con
centration in the market.
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mission would then be forced to attack each leasing agreement
individually.
However, this does not appear to be the situation in the bus tire
leasing case. In view of the various "fringe" practices that coexist
with the basic leasing agreement, it is submitted that no quantum
of economic evidence could be introduced to dispel their unfair char-
acter and their restrictive effect upon competition."' The leasing
policy, by itself, may be compatible with business good faith. How-
ever, when the basic agreement is coupled with the restrictive
servicing provisions, a "buy-out" clause necessary for termination,
and the practice of building up inventory before termination, there
appears to be substantial evidence upon which the Commission could
rest a section 5 violation. The anticompetitive effects produced by
this combination of practices appear no different from the effects of
those practices which have been held unfair methods of competition
in earlier cases. Further, the Court in Triangle Conduit, through its
interpretation of Cement Institute, expressly upheld both the finding
of conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and unlawful
individual conduct under Section 5 of the FTCA. It appears then,
that the Commission has precedent for condemning these leasing
agreements as unfair methods of competition.
It seems, however, that the Commission has perhaps blinded
itself to the possible consequences of a proven allegation. If the com-
plaint were upheld, not on grounds of unnecessarily restrictive
servicing provisions, but instead on the Commission's theory of con:-
scious parallel behavior, what type of a decree could be drafted?
What test could the Supreme Court develop to govern future situa-
tions? Would all businessmen who face substantially the same market
factors and who react in identical ways run the risk of a section 5
complaint because of parallel business behavior? These and other
uncertainties raised by this potential use of section 5 suggest that a
more appropriate theory is necessary to support the unfair method
of competition charge.
The recent Supreme Court decision in the TBA trilogy' 32 con-
centrated upon the market power of a manufacturer as a determina-
tive factor in proving an unfair method of competition. Indeed, the
final decision of the trilogy, FTC v. Texaco,'" seems to denote certain
uses of market power as per se violations of section 5. Texaco held
that practices which result from the manufacturer's market power
and which unfairly burden a significant volume of commerce are
inherently coercive and constitute unfair methods of competition.'"
181 See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC,
360 F.2c1 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); and FTC v. Texaco,
393 U.S. 223 (1968).
132 Id.
133 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
134 Id. at 228-30.
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In finding that Texaco held dominant economic power, the Court
concluded that such power was "inherent in the structure and econom-
ics of the petroleum distribution system." 1" By analogy then, it would
appear that the requisite market power is also inherent in the struc-
ture and economics of the bus tire distribution market, and the leasing
agreements resulting from that power are unduly restrictive, creating
an unfair burden upon competition.
The facts alleged by the FTC in the bus tire complaint seem to
support the theory that each manufacturer has abusively manipulated
his market power to coerce customers into agreements benefiting
himself and fellow competitors. The fact that each manufacturer
can obtain such a lease agreement from his customer clearly demon-
strates, without more, an excessive degree of market power. A tie-in
contract presents a similar economic situation. There the seller, by
virtue of his position in the market for the tying product, has enough
economic leverage to induce his customers to take the tied item along
with the tying product. As long as the seller has sufficient economic
power regarding the tying product to appreciably restrain free com-
petition in the market for the tied item, he is considered to possess
excessive market power.'" Despite this analogy, application of the
market power theory to the tire-leasing agreements is subject to
the argument that without all five manufacturers demanding the
same agreement, no one manufacturer would command the economic
power necessary to do so. In reality then, no single manufacturer
controls dominant economic power. All collectively share in monopoly
power. Shared monopoly differs from market power in that no single
competitor possesses the power to act alone without regard for the
retaliatory power of competitors. In this shared situation, unless all
competitors follow each other, little change in market conditions will
result. Shared monopoly power is differentiated from interdependent
oligopoly power in that the former is maintained and expanded
through predatory practices.'" The various clauses of the tire leasing
agreements are indicative of shared monopoly power.
The analysis of market structure in Texaco arguably bolsters
the charge of excessive market power against the tire manufacturers.
The oligopolistic structure of the tire industry, and the mutual inter-
dependence of the tire companies regarding business decisions,
encouraged the marketing decisions of each competitor. Each manu-
facturer commands excessive market power at present, despite its
dependence upon the group for survival. Each individually accounts
135 Id. at 226.
136 See, e.g., International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ;
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v: United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 n.21 (1953); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954); and Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969).
157 See Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Ecimomic Regulatory Policies,
82 Elam L. Rev. 1207, 1212-27 (1969).
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for a large share of the market from which it cannot easily be di-
vested. Condemnation of each competitor's practice as an unfair
method of competition is suggested as an alternative approach to
the theory of parallel business behavior. Although market power
cannot be specifically defined, the incidents that result from it are
tangible. The tire-leasing agreement, like the sales-commission con-
tract, can be prohibited by an FTC order forbidding its use. Drafting
such an order presents fewer conceptual problems than an order
prohibiting parallel business behavior. Utilization of the market power
theory in this case would inform the business community of another
limitation section 5 places upon economic power, and would avoid
the uncertainties inherent in the concept of condemning parallel busi-
ness behavior as an unfair method of competition.
V. THE CURRENT DEBATE ON SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT
POLICIES
It is the fundamental thesis of the approach suggested herein
that the antitrust policy of evaluating industrial conduct and business
performance is incapable of dealing with existing concentrated indus-
tries. Even though Section 5 of the FTCA may jurisdictionally be a
proper method of attacking unfair methods of business behavior, it
is not the most appropriate remedy. The prohibition of unfair conduct
provides only a short run solution, for it cannot reach the heart of
the problem—the inherently anticompetitive oligopolis tic market. A
more lasting solution is available through the use of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act"' and divestiture.
The antitrust laws are presently in the process of adaptation to
a complicated economic disorder—oligopoly power—which is a prob-
lem not of business behavior but of market structure.'" Prior to
1962, antitrust enforcement consistently approached the problem of
industrial concentration from the conduct and business performance
points of view, rather than from a structural point of view. Since
1962, however, the Supreme Court has struck directly at oligopolistic
power and has acted to curb its growth. 14°
However, the new awareness demonstrated by these decisions
139 15 U.S.C. $$ 1-7 (1970). Section 2 states: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."
139 Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts—From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1967).
140 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 - (1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966).
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does not concern itself with oligopoly power already entrenched and
operating, but rather with the prevention of further concentration in
marginally competitive markets. Significantly, the Court has adopted
as the foundation of its antitrust policy a sound economic premise:"'
a horizontal market structure that creates a concentrated oligopoly
composed of only several firms is inherently anticompetitive. This
approach to antitrust policy shifts the emphasis of regulation from a
conduct-performance analysis to a structural analysis. In light of the
Court's acceptance of this economic premise, consideration of its de-
velopment is necessary in order to understand its significance.
Market power in an oligopolistic market is quite different from
that in a purely competitive market. Oligopoly has been defined as
"the form of imperfect competition which obtains when sellers are few
in number and any one of them is of such size that an increase or
decrease in his output will appreciably affect the market price."'"
Oligopoly power is that power possessed by jointly-acting oligopo-
lists.'" The underlying premise of the concept of oligopolistic power
is that conduct by firms in a market in which there are only a few
sellers is fundamentally different from conduct in a "purely competi-
tive" market composed of many sellers and buyers.'" The rational
self-interest of sellers having similar cost factors in an oligopolistic
market, who are intent upon maximizing profits, will lead them to
charge identical prices and eventually to arrive at an identical
equilibrium price which will yield the largest return. Not unnaturally,
this price may be the same price that a monopolist, intent' upon maxi-
mizing profits, would charge. In the purely competitive market, the
situation is - quite different. Here the market share of a single competi-
tor is not significantly affected by a price cut, so that as a matter of
rational, economic self-interest, no competitive response will occur.
Hence, the would-be price cutter is not inhibited in his market action.
Further, other sellers and new entrants also feel free to reduce price
if they determine it would increase profits by increasing business,
ultimately forcing the market price well below a monopoly pricing
level, to the point where "zero" profit in the economic sense would be
made by all firms."i°
Both theoretical and empirical economic studies have observed
that price uniformity in an oligopolistic market can result without any
formal or informal agreement. A pattern of price leadership develops
.	 .
141 Brodley, supra note 139, at 338. See also Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimen-
sional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422 (1965) and Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust
Theory: I, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 401 (1965).
142
 C. Wilcox, Competition & Monopoly in American Industry 5, TNEC Monograph
No. 21, (1940).
1 4 3 Brodley, supra note 139, at 289.
144 See E. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, chapters 2 and
3, (7th ed. 1956); J. Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition (1st ed. 1933).
1 46 F. Machlup, The Economics of Seller's Competition 347-74 (1952); J. Bain,
Industrial Organization 266-315 (1959).
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in an industry in which one seller becomes the price leader, while the
other firms follow the leader's judgment of the changing market situ-
ation in return for certainty of knowledge as to their rival's actions.
In economic terminology, such an interrelated phenomenon it referred
to as "mutual interdependence" or "shared mOnopoly." 1" It also has
been characterized as an "agreement to agree" that Would not Con-
stitute an agreement in any legal sense, but rather the uniform re-
sponse of competitive firths. 147 In light of these differences between a
competitive and an oligopolistic market, and the Supreme Court's
recent recognition of the inherent anticompetitive nature of oligopoly,
the different approaches to controlling oligOpoly power. will be ana-
lyzed.
A. The Conduct Approach
The conduct approach, as distinguished from the structural and
performance apprOacheS, analyzes those actions taken by the bUtiness-
man as a patt of his competitive strategy. In particular, thit approach
is concerned with actions that reflect the baSis iipOn 'which he makes
his price and output detisiont. Such actions indicate (1) that he is
either making decisions independently or collusively (collusive in the
economic sense, that is, oligopolistiC interdependence) and (2)
whether he is, though not acting collusively, engaging in predatory or
exclusionary practices against hit competitors, his s uppliers Of' his
customers.'"
The proponents of the conduct approach differ from the struc-
turalists in their evaluation of business reaction to different market
structures. In the Conduct approach the Mere existence of the power
to restrict output and to charge noncompetitive . prices does not neces-
sarily mean that such power Will be used.'" The concern is whethet
the condUCt is anticompetitive, not whether the practice restilted from
a dominant market power position. This has led to the criticism that
the conduct approach concentrates oh the symptoms and not the
disease.'" Other critics Of this approach contend that conceptiOnt of
fair conduct are diffictilt to define and administer,, thus creating a
general feeling of indecision and uncertainty for butinestrnen and
administrators. The most telling criticism of the conduct approach,
also applicable to section 5 , may be seen in the short run aspects of a
FTC cease and desist order. A Commission order in the tire nianufac-
thrers case Might eliminate the unfairness of the lease agreement, but
would leave intact the structural interdependence that brought it into
existence.
148 See Turner, supra note 137, at 1225.
147 See F. Machlup, supra note 145, at 443-44 and J. Bain, supra note 145, at 296-98.
148 Mueller, The New Antitrust: A 'Structural' Approach, 1 Antitrust Law & Econ.
Rev. 87, 90 n.8 (1967).
148 Id, at 93.
180 Id. at 108-09.
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B. The Performance Approach
The performance approach refers to an analysis of the economic
results of business conduct. Special emphasis is placed on a firm's con-
tribution to the economy, including its effect on: (1) efficiency in
production and distribution; (2) maintenance of full employment
with price stability; (3) achievement of a high rate of progress in
technology and productivity; and (4) equity in the distribution of
income.' The performance school of thought has been termed the
"workable competition" approach—the approach most often applied in
formulating antitrust policy.'" Conceptually, the doctrine of workable
competition has been defined as:
[A] rough and ready judgment by some economists . . .
that a particular industry is performing reasonably well .. .
relative to alternative industrial arrangements which are
practically attainable. There are no objective criteria of
workable competition, and such criteria as are proffered are
at best intuitively reasonable modifications of the rigorous
and abstract criteria of perfect competition.'"
Performance theorists support their position by contending that if a
firm's performance is good, then, by definition, all the important
market forces including competition are functioning in a "workable"
manner. An industry's competitive structure and conduct are analyzed
within the framework of the industry's "workably competitive" per-
formance.'"
Critics of the performance approach, like those of the conduct
approach, consider it ineffective as a means of regulation, alleging that
once "unworkable competition" is established, it offers no remedy to
deal with the problem. Having denied the existence of any causal
relationship between structure and performance, the performance ap-
proach cannot logically prescribe divestiture. Further, the remedy of
injunctive relief is faced with the problem of framing an order which
will effectively tell oligopolists to compete, a command which is as
difficult to enforce as it is to draft.'"
C. The Structural Approach
Since 1962, in an effort to prevent further concentration, the
Justice Department has incorporated the structural approach into its
151 Caves, American Industry, Structure Conduct and Performance 95 (1964); see
also C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 62-70 (1959).
152 See, e.g., Stocking, On the Concept of Workable Competition as an Antitrust
Guide, 2 Antitrust Bull. 3 (1956); and Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Com-
petition or Workable , Monopoly, 63 Yale L.J. 348 (1954).
153 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws at 339 (1955).
154 Mueller, supra note 148, at 94-95.
155 Id. at. 102.
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policy. determinations concerning mergers , and acquisitions."" Struc-
ture refers to those relatively permanent features of a market which
are beyond the short .run control of the individual firm and which
thus constitute the boundaries that restrain competitive action. The
more significant structural factors are: (1) degree of concentration,
(2) barriers to entry, and (3) product differentiation. 1 e7 Concentration
in an oligopolistic market, the base from which the other two features
obtain vitality, gives rise to "mutual interdependence" between com-
petitors, allowing them to begin pricing as collective monopolists in-
stead of independent producers.'" Product differentiation provides
market power to command premium prices, while barriers to entry
intensify concentration which in turn leads to overpricing.
The structuralists maintain that "an industry which does not
have a competitive structure will not have competitive behavior."'
A chain of causation running from structure to conduct to performance
underpins the essential thesis of the structuralist school of thought.
Structure is said to determine conduct which in turn determines per-
formance. Structuralists would contend that in an anticompetitive
structure the compelling pressure of the structural factors militates
against the long run survival of effectively competitive conduct or
performance.'"
The structural approach differs in many respects from the tradi-
tional "per se" approach. Under the latter, price fixing, for example,
is declared to be so inherently anticompetitive that it is, without more,
illegal. Under the structural approach a market structure which is not
in and of itself illegal, but which is conducive to the emergence of
anticompetitive conduct, gives rise to the presumption that arrange-
ments, mergers and other acts that tend to create or maintain such a
market structure are illegal.'" In determining whether a challenged
activity unreasonably restrains trade under the Sherman Act, or
whether it is an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, a prime consideration is the relationship between
the challenged conduct and the existing market structure.
The following advantages would result from such a reformulation
of antitrust theory:"2
(1) legal rules could be constructed which carefully differ-
Ise See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 Trade Reg. Rep.
	 4430 at
6681 (1968).
1117 Mueller, supra note 148, at 89 n.7. Product differentiation is generally defined as
the extent to which substitute products are distinguished from each other in the minds
of purchasers. This differentiation permits the seller of a differentiated product to acquire
a favored position over his competitors in terms of market price. Id. at 90 n.7.
1 I18 J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition 12 . (1965).
160 United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 426 (1956)
(Warren, C. J.,.dissenting).
160 Mueller, supra note 148, at 91.
161 Brodley, supra note 139, at 339.
162 Id. at 34041.
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entiate betWeen the market activities of monopolistic or
oligopolistic firms and those of other firms. Such a distinction
might permit a relaxation of merger rules concerning non=
oligopolistic firms, thereby heightening the opportunity for
these firms. to challenge the oligopolists;
(2) once the relevant market is defined, the structural ap-
pearance of oligopoly is quite readily recognized;
(3) by limiting the operation of antitrust rules to oligopo-
listic firms and markets, the construction of simplified rules,
such as the prima facie presumption, is made possible; " 3
(4) the result of focusing the rules primarily upon market
structure, rather than on the exercise of market power,
avoids difficult complexities; Questions of efficiency, progres-
siveness, ease of entry, substitute competition effectiveness,
and other economic issues obscure predictability and uni-
form enforcement when the rules attempt to determine
whether oligopoly power has been used. Rules which focus
,primarily on market structure, however, avoid these complex
issues in the first instance. Yet, prima facie presuMptions
based on Market structure still provide the challenged com-
petitor an opportunity to offer, in rebuttal, economic data
showing no threat to competition.
Despite general agreement among structuralists that a reformu-
lation of antitrust policy is essential if the enforcement agencies are
to deal effectively with oligopolies, there is disagreement as to the
proper methods of enforcement. The two options most frequently
offered by the structuralist are (1) divestiture and dissolution of the
concentrated industry, and (2) removal of barriers to entry, thus
allowing natural deconcentration.'" The latter option has received
much greater acceptance as a result of the "harshness" normally
ascribed to divestiture.
The leading proponent of enforcement through divestiture, 185
Professor Turner, initially suggested that additional legislation,
capable of appropriately dealing with oligopoly, was the only available
solution, considering the inadequacies of the Sherman Act.'" The
163 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), and Turner,
Conglomerate Mergeri and Section 7 of the Claybin Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1386,
1391 (1965). See also United States v. Grinnel Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.1. 1964)
(Wyzanski, J.).
164 The barriers method of enforcement, however, would not apply to naturally-
created public monopolies or oligopolies such as public utilities. The barriers to entry in
those industries are created by law for regulatory purposes.
265 See C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959); Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Ad: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962); and Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic
Regulatory Policies, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207 (1969). See also Asc.12, Collusive OligbpoIy: An
Antitrust Quandry, 2 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 53 (1969).
168 C. Kaysen &'D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 266-69 (1959).
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thesis supporting his initial position was that the oligopolist's inter-
dependence in decision-making, resulting from market structure with-
out any formal agreement, placed it outside the scope of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. The rational oligopolist behaves in precisely the
same manner as the rational seller in a competitively structured
industry; he simply takes into account the reactions of his fellow
oligopolists, an inherent result of the structural makeup of the
market.'" In Professor Turner's opinion, such behavior should not
be considered illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Recently Professor Turner has altered his position as regards
the need for additional legislation. He has proposed the use of strin-
gent merger guidelines to prevent future concentration in industries
that are now competitive, and divestiture of the more serious, per-
sistent and economically significant monopolies and oligopolies. He
suggests that an economy of scale level of production, without excess
capacity, would produce and maintain a competitive market struc-
ture."'"
Professor Turner suggests that instances of oligopolistic markets,
in which relatively few sellers effectively share monopoly power, occur
more frequently than instances of individually held monopoly power.'"
However, beyond several cases involving explicit conspiracy to ex-
clude, there is a dearth of precedent which would support divestiture
of shared monopolies. Section 1, he concludes, provides no relief in a
structurally shared monopoly situation. However, by analogizing to
individual monopoly power and its judicial treatment under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, Professor Turner finds it possible to suggest that:
If it is inappropriate for a single monopolist to employ
long-term leases that are not terminable cheaply and that
discriminate against competition because they are more re-
strictive than any acceptable business justification would
warrant, I cannot see why the same should not be true of
leading firms that share market dominance. Indeed, a prac-
tice that can be so characterized could reasonably be deemed
unlawful without regard to the market power . . . [and]
where no contract or "agreement" is involved, be deemed an
unlawful "attempt" to monopolize under section 2. 1"
Thus, he suggests that divestiture of all oligopolists down to a com-
petitive economies of scale level provides the most appropriate relief."'
Excess output capacity resulting from seller concentration produces
non-competitive prices and excess profits."' By requiring a level of
167 Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 663-71 (1962).
168 Turner, supra note 137, at 1214-17.
160 Id. at 1225.
170 Id. at 1228.
171 Id. at 1231 n.45.
172 J, Bain, Industrial Organization 448 (2d ed. 1968).
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production consistent with a manufacturer's operative scale, the ma-
nipulation of supply and demand factors by oligopolists is curtailed
and the market is converted into a competitively responsive structure.
The long run gains resulting from this structural change are self
evident:
Proponents of the removal of barriers approach contend that
"alteration of the condition of entry might constitute a generally more
feasible regulatory technique than dissolution and dismemberment
policies aimed just at reducing seller concentration."'" They postulate
that once artificial barriers have been pulled down, dissolution of the
large market shares held by the industry leaders will be accomplished
naturally by the entry of other businesses. These new entrants will
gradually restore the market's competitive character.'
The most severe criticism of dissolution as a remedy focuses upon
its disruptive effects.' The economies of scale proposed by Professor
Turner is considered to involve appreciable social costs. 176 Reconsti-
tution of a major industry is believed to involve not only substantial
administrative costs but also a risk that the firms might be separated
into units smaller than the efficient scale of operation in that industry,
thus causing much greater social costs. Although an overreaching
dissolution may be prevented by allowing proof that economies of
scale would be lost in any reduction of firm size, expensive litigation
costs, nevertheless, would be incurred. The difficulties in determining
the most efficient size are such that erroneous results may frequently
occur, thereby sacrificing the prior existing economies of scale. 177
The Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition"'
(referred to as the "Stigler Report"), recently requested by President
Nixon, categorically endorsed the structural approach to antitrust
policy and inferentially proposed the "barriers method" of enforcement.
Recognizing the need for ease of entry to prevent market concentra-
tion, the Stigler Report states:
Concern with oligopoly has led to proposals to use the
antitrust laws (perhaps amended) to deconcentrate highly
oligopolistic industries by dissolving their leading firms. We
cannot endorse these proposals on the basis of existing
knowledge. . . . [W] e are confident that structural remedies
will be sanctioned by the courts in cases where, due to num-
ber of firms and the other conditions of the market, lesser
remedies are likely to be unavailing.'"
173 J. Bain, supra note 158, at 208.
174 See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 139, at 344-45; Mueller, supra note 148, at 129;
and. Posner, Oligopoly and Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev.
1562, 1593-98 (1969). .
175 Id.
176 Posner, supra note 174, at 1594.
177 Id.
175 2 Antitrust Law and Econ. Rev. 13 (1969).
175 Id. at 26-27.
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As evidenced from this report, dissolution has not yet gained
general acceptance as a remedy for oligopolistic concentration. Per-
haps further economic research is necessary in the area of efficiency
and scale of operation before such an approach will be effectively and
confidently applied. This is not to say, however, that dissolution
should never be invoked. As the Stigler Report states: "Collusion that
can be incontrovertibly inferred from behavior (such as persistent,
stable price discrimination in the economist's sense) should not bring
immunity from the Sherman Act . . . 2'1" Perhaps collusion can be
inferred from the behavior of the tire manufacturing industry in its
commercial bus tire market. When economic data substantiates that
ninety nine percent of a market is controlled by five manufacturers,
structural alterations must be made, regardless of the method of en-
forcement used.
CONCLUSION
In this article it has been suggested that Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, while applicable to parallel courses of business
behavior, would still be remedially ineffective because the relief provided
would be short run. In order to return effective competition to the bus
tire market of the tire industry, the government must attack market
structure rather than business conduct or performance. Recently,
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been suggested as a medium through
which such a result may be reached. 181
Recent developments concerning the Federal Trade Commission's
complaint against the tire manufacturers further substantiate the
inappropriateness of using Section 5 of the FTCA. The tire manufac-
turers have recently obtained from the FTC a consolidated consent
orderm barring certain tire leasing arrangements. The effect of this
order is to settle the potentially far reaching FTC complaint without
a court challenge. The rationale behind the manufacturers' consent
decree is obvious. As a result of the consent order the leasing arrange-
ments have been refashioned to appear "fair" in both conduct and
performance. However, the structure supporting their mutual inter-
dependence has been left intact. The remaining structure will permit
innovative corporate counsel and executives to soon implement new
types of equally restrictive arrangements. Moreover, when five manu-
facturers structurally control ninety nine percent of the market, the
apparent inference to be drawn is that no manipulative conduct ar-
rangement is even necessary. Their market position, without more, will
provide a more than profitable return, free of competition. By accept-
ing the consent order, then, the FTC has postponed court determina-
tion of the theory that parallel business behavior in an oligopolistic
188 Id. at 27.
181 See, Turner, supra note 137; but see also Posner, supra note 174.
182 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1 19,522 at 21,595 (1971).
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market may constitute an unfair method of competition. In addition,
the oligopolistic market structure of the bus tire industry continues
untramelled as a source of restrictive practices.
ROBERT E. SCHABERG
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